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1.

TRANSPARENCY THROUGH INSURANCE: MANDATES DOMINATE DISCRETION

Tom Baker*

This chapter describes how liability insurance has contributed to
the transparency of the civil justice system.
main points.

The chapter makes three

First, much of what we know about the empirics of the

civil justice system comes from access to liability insurance data and
personnel.

Second, as long as access to liability insurance data and

personnel depends on the discretion of liability insurance
organizations, this knowledge will be incomplete and, most likely,
biased in favor of the public policy agenda of the organizations
providing discretionary access to the data.

Third, although mandatory

disclosure of liability insurance data would improve transparency, a
reasonably complete understanding of the empirics of the civil justice
system also requires mandatory disclosure of the payments and defense
expenditures that are not covered by liability insurance.
The first part of this chapter describes existing approaches to
transparency through liability insurance in the U.S.

The second part

analyzes the role of liability insurance in promoting transparency in
several discrete civil justice arenas – auto, medical, and products
liability – and, for comparison purposes, workers’ compensation.

The

concluding section addresses objectives to expanding mandatory claims
reporting and links the discussion in this chapter to the literature on
the relationship between liability and insurance more generally.
EXISTING APPROACHES TO TRANSPARENCY THROUGH LIABILITY INSURANCE
The terms “transparency” and “civil justice system” require
definition.

For present purposes, “transparency” refers to the degree

to which the system is open to public view for (a) direct observation
____________
* University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Thank you to Ina Ebert,
Christian Lahnstein, James Macdonald, Robert Reville, and Charles Silver
for comments and helpful discussion.
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and (b) systematic analysis by researchers so that general
understandings about the operation of the system can be drawn.

For

present purposes, the “civil justice system” refers to the institutions
centrally involved in providing redress for individuals who have been
harmed in some way that is recognized as compensable through tort or
related liability law.

Under this expansive definition, the civil

justice system includes courts, law firms, governmental legal offices or
agencies (such as state attorney general offices), parts of the
organized bar, other organizations that assist claimants or defendants,
and liability insurance institutions. Massively repeat players such as
health insurance and workers’ compensation organizations (which have
subrogation rights in thousands of claims) and defendants with very
large claims portfolios (such as utilities and governmental entities)
might also appropriately be regarded as part of the civil justice
system, not just users of the system, particularly when they develop
specialized organizational structures for the resolution of claims for
civil redress.
These definitions help make clear that liability insurance is both
part of the civil justice system and also a window through which to
observe other parts of the system.

Liability insurance institutions

themselves can be more or less transparent, and they can provide a more
or less transparent window on many aspects of the civil justice system:
the aggregate sums transferred through different categories of claims
over time, the amounts paid to different categories of victims, the
timing of the resolution of different categories of claims, the fees
paid to plaintiffs and defense counsel, and the amount and distribution
of settlement payments to subrogating first party insurers, to name just
a few topics that could be illuminated through access to insurance
industry data.
Liability insurance contributes to the transparency of the civil
justice system in the U.S. through the following channels: (1)
discretionary access to insurance company data and personnel; (2) public
access to data collected and analyzed by insurance industry information
service providers; (3) public access to the financial reports filed with
regulatory authorities; and (4) public access to the mandatory claim

- 3 -

level reporting required in the medical liability arena.

The following

sections describe each of these.
Discretionary Access to Liability Insurance Company Information
The liability insurance industry has a long history of providing
information to civil justice researchers on a voluntary basis.

H.

Laurence Ross’s renowned study of automobile liability law-in-action was
possible only because two major auto insurance companies permitted him
to observe and interview their automobile insurance adjusters (Ross,
1970).

Most of the medical liability closed claims studies were

possible only because medical liability insurers provided access to
researchers. (Summarized in Baker, 2005a; see also Studdert et al.,
2006).

Liability insurers have provided civil justice researchers with

computerized claims data that have made it possible to assess the impact
of legal rules on litigation and settlement (e.g. Yoon 2001, Yoon and
Baker, 2006).

In addition, liability insurance industry personnel have

participated in qualitative civil justice research and in survey
research

(Baker, 2001; Carroll et al., 2005; Pace et al.; 2007, Baker

and Griffith, 2007)
At the same time, however, the liability insurance industry has a
long history of refusing to provide information to civil justice
researchers.

For a researcher, the process of obtaining access to

insurance company information is time consuming and uncertain at best.
One risk-averse person in a long chain of command is enough to stop any
research project.

And who, really, can blame that risk-averse person?

Granting researchers access to insurance company data is a public
service that is unlikely to provide any private benefit to the company
that provides the access.
Liability insurers benefit from greater understanding of the
operation of the civil justice system and, thus, granting access to
researchers can be understood in some cases as one insurer’s
contribution to the success of the industry as a whole. In other cases,
the decision makers in the company may be curious or public-spirited,
and the public access may be understood as a form of charitable
contribution.

In either event, however, case-by-case decisions by
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individual insurance companies to provide voluntary access to civil
justice researchers cannot serve as a reliable foundation for civil
justice transparency, as important as that access in fact has been to
some researchers. (e.g., Rolph et al., 2007)
Discretionary access to liability insurance data cannot serve as a
reliable foundation for two structural reasons that have nothing to do
with the limits of the data.

First, liability insurers derive a

competitive advantage from having better data than the competition, and
they cannot be reasonably expected to give away that advantage.

Better

data allows pricing that is more finely attuned to the risk, providing a
competitive advantage in the adverse selection “arms race” at the
underwriting stage of the insurance relationship (Baker 2003, and better
data should lead to a better understanding of the claims environment,
providing a competitive advantage in selecting and pricing claims for
settlement.
Second, the liability insurance organizations have interests at
stake in public policy debates that can be affected by research on the
civil justice system.

Those interests provide an incentive to be

selective in granting discretionary access to data.

Research that rests

on voluntarily provided data is very likely to be biased in favor of the
perceived interests of the organization providing the data – for the
very human and very understandable reason that people are more likely to
give things to people who they see as allies.

A researcher whose prior

research is seen as contrary to an insurer’s public policy agenda is
much less likely to be given access to data than a researcher whose
prior research is seen as helpful to that agenda.
Public Access to Insurance Industry Information Service Providers
Liability insurers need to understand the civil justice system in
order to price insurance and manage claims.

Thus, it is hardly

surprising that the industry collects and analyzes civil justice data.
Some of these data are shared among insurance companies, typically
through insurance industry information service providers.

This

information is generally not available to civil justice researchers,
however, and, thus, does not contribute to civil justice transparency.
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Traditionally, the most important liability insurance industry
service provider in the U.S. has been the Insurance Services Office
(ISO), Inc., which collects and analyzes a wide variety of liability
insurance data.1

ISO also serves for some purposes as the interface

between insurance companies and the regulatory authorities and, thus,
fills a quasi-regulatory role. ISO collects individual claim level data
from member companies but it does not make those data available to
researchers.

ISO uses the data to estimate prospective loss costs that

members can use for pricing purposes and to provide required information
to state insurance regulatory authorities.
The ISO database is not designed to be a policy or individualclaim-level database but rather a company-level database. Thus, it
appears that the ISO data would be useful for estimating trends in
aggregate claim costs within and among member companies on a state-bystate basis.

This could be very useful for studying the impact of

state-level changes in liability law, among other civil justice topics
of interest. ISO regards the individual and company-level data as
confidential and does not make it available to researchers, however.
ISO does prepare reports using the aggregate information and would
consider on a case-by-case basis whether to permit researchers to use
the aggregate data.
The Insurance Research Council (IRC) is a significant exception to
the general rule of refusing to grant civil justice researchers access
to data.

The IRC has played a major role in increasing the transparency

of automobile accident claiming, the largest part of the liability
insurance market.
Every five years since 1987, the IRC has collected and then
published two significant claims-level data sets. The first data set in
each year is closed-claim data provided by auto insurance companies that
collectively account for 65 – 70 % of auto insurance by premium volume.
Each participating company establishes a two-week window in the spring
and fills out a form for every auto claim closed with payment during
____________
1 Information about ISO is based on a phone conversation with ISO
government affairs official Mary Size, October 3, 2007.
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that window.

The result is a closed-claim file with about 80,000 claims

for each year.
The second data set is a survey of a nationally representative
panel of consumers from approximately the same time as the claims data
are collected.

The IRC survey asks a variety of questions about

consumption patterns, including whether anyone in the household was
injured in an auto accident in the previous three years.

If so, the

participants are asked questions about injuries, claims, and
compensation.

These data provide information on other sources available

for compensation for auto injuries, on injuries that do not produce an
auto insurance claim, and on injuries from claims that are dropped or
denied.

Both data sets have been useful to civil justice researchers

(e.g., Carroll and Abrahamse, 2001).
C. Access to Mandatory Financial Reporting
Public Insurance companies admitted to do business in the U.S. must
provide financial reports to the insurance regulatory authorities.

The

regulatory authorities aggregate this financial information and provide
public access under the auspices of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). The underlying, company-by-company data
are available for purchase, and researchers have made good use of these
data to study trends in the civil justice system costs and the effects
of state level legal changes

(Born and Viscusi, 1998). In addition, a

variety of information service providers purchase this financial
information and repackage it in forms that can be useful to civil
justice researchers.

For example, Best’s Aggregates and Averages has

long provided aggregate financial information about a substantial part
of the civil justice system that is very useful for monitoring trends in
liability costs over time (Baker, 2005b).
All of these financial data have very serious limitations, however,
relating to the fact that the underlying financial reports are designed
to allow insurance regulators to monitor the solvency of liability
insurance companies and in some cases to assess insurance company rating
plans, not to provide civil justice transparency.

This design objective
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affects the data in many ways, only three of which will be described
here.
First, the financial reports contain more detailed information
about “incurred” losses than they do about either “developed” losses or
paid claims. Incurred losses are accounting entries that reflect the
insurers’ obligation to pay claims in the future. The decision to focus
on future predicted payments rather than payments actually made in the
past makes a great deal of sense from a solvency perspective, because an
insurer’s obligations to pay future claims has a greater impact on the
solvency of the company than money it already paid. Unfortunately,
predictions about future claims are subject to a well-documented, but
complicated and poorly publicized insurance industry business cycle –
the “underwriting cycle.” This underwriting cycle leads to periodic
insurance crises that involve rapid increases in predicted losses
(Baker, 2005b).

Because of this cycle and because of money illusion

(i.e., the common tendency to forget that a unit of money spent in the
past had greater value than the same unit of money has today because of
inflation), it is easy to selectively present the incurred loss
information in a way that makes it appear as if the civil justice system
is growing explosively when the reality is that claim payments are
increasing at about the same rate as inflation. (E.g.,, compare
Tillinghast Towers-Perrin 2002 with Tillinghast Towers-Perrin 2007.)
Second, the aggregate premium information does not reveal the price
for insurance coverage, particularly on an annual basis.2

The

underwriting cycle affects many aspects of the insurance contract, not
just price.

Insurance contract terms become more restrictive during a

hard market and less restrictive over the course of a softening market.
Because buyers are likely to adjust the amount of coverage that they buy
in response to the cycle, changes in aggregate premiums on a year-toyear basis likely understate price changes in any given year.

For

example, a large increase in the aggregate premiums at the start of the
____________
2 Surveys of insurance prices, such as the annual reports of the
Medical Liability Monitor, provide useful information, but recent
research suggests that the “list prices” reported in these surveys
differ significantly from the prices that actually are paid. (Rodwin
2008).

- 8 -

hard market likely understates the increase in insurance prices, because
buyers raise their deductibles and decrease their policy limits in
response to the higher prices.

Moreover, insurance companies may be

simultaneously introducing more restrictive contract terms, thereby
reducing the extent of the insurance protection provided.

Similarly,

stable aggregate premiums during the latter part of a soft market may
well hide declining prices, even ignoring inflation, as buyers reduce
deductibles and increase limits in response to a lower price.
Third, the reports do not provide any information about liabilities
that are not covered by traditional liability insurance.

Captive

insurance companies, risk retention groups, and other organizations that
provide alternatives to traditional insurance are not required to file
these reports.

Nor are organizations that self-insure through means

other than captive insurance companies.

As a result, Best’s Aggregates

and Averages and other compilations of the NAIC data do not provide any
information about the claims or losses or prices of these alternative
risk transfer or retention options.

This omission is very significant

for liabilities that are commonly addressed through alternative risk
transfer or retention arrangements, such as medical and product
liabilities.

Moreover, because there is reason to believe that the

extent of insured losses varies along with the underwriting cycle,
efforts to measure the civil justice system using the NAIC data are
likely to present a misleading picture of the rate and direction of
change.
D. Public Access to Closed-Claim Reports
The medical malpractice arena provides an exception to the general
rule that liability insurance companies do not provide public access to
their closed-claim reports.

Medical malpractice insurance companies in

the U.S. are required by law to file two kinds of claim reports:
•

National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). Insurance companies
and other malpractice payers are required to file reports
with the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) that provide
information about any medical malpractice payment made for
the benefit of a physician, dentist, or other healthcare
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practitioner (HRSA, 2001).
not public.

Reports filed with the NPDB are

Nevertheless, the NPDB does release information

in forms that are useful for research purposes.

It is

possible to track claim payments by state, specialty, and
date.

Beginning in 2004 it became possible to track payments

by type of allegation and injury.3 Unfortunately, the NPDB
only contains reports for payments made on behalf of
individual practitioners.

It does not contain reports of

payments made on behalf of entities such as hospitals or
urgent care centers.

There are anecdotal reports that

malpractice claim settlements are sometimes structured so
that one or more defendant entities pay the entire settlement
so that no report needs to be filed regarding a practitioner
defendant.
the NPDB.

This possibility compromises the usefulness of
Nevertheless, the limited public access to the

NPDB has enhanced the transparency of the medical malpractice
aspect of the civil justice system. (E.g., Baicker & Chandra
2005, Chandra et al 2005, Dhankar et al 2007)
•

State Closed Claim Data. Some states also require medical
malpractice insurance companies to file individual closedclaim reports to the insurance regulatory authorities,
typically for medical liability claims (Cohen and Hughes,
2007). Two large states – Florida and Texas – have long
permitted public access to those reports and a third state,
Missouri, recently opened its database to academic
researchers.4

Building on that experience, the Statistical

Information Task force of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners is preparing a model law that would
provide a framework for more states to collect this
____________
3 http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/pubs/stats/Public_Use_Data_File.pdf
4 For a recent description of the available researcher access to data on
medical malpractice claims, see the comments filed by Professor Charles
Silver and other academics with the NAIC Statistical Information Task
Force, available at:
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_sitf_070918_med_mal_academia.
pdf
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information on a more uniform basis.

The current draft of

the model law applies only to medical liability and it leaves
open the question of public access.
In most cases, these regimes were established during highly
pressured legislative drafting sessions at the height of liability
insurance crises, without input from civil justice researchers. As a
result, they have a number of shortcomings, including the following:
•

The information the states collect is not uniform

•

The closed claim report forms often do not require insurers
to provide information about the severity of the injuries or
other important claim-specific information

•

Little or no information is collected about claims that are
closed with no payment or a small payment

•

In some cases there are doubts about the accuracy of the
information that the insurance companies provide

•

In most cases, the reports must be filed only for medical
liability claims, and

•

With the notable exceptions of Florida, Texas, and Missouri,
the states do not permit civil justice researchers to analyze
the data.

Yet, despite this gap between the actual and the ideal, the
mandatory closed-claim reports have made a very substantial contribution
to knowledge of the medical liability part of the civil justice system.
Each of the now increasing number of articles published by the research
teams analyzing the Florida and Texas data has made a significant
contribution (Black, et al., 2005; Hyman, et al., 2007; Vidmar, et al.,
2005; Vidmar, et al., 2006; Zeiler, et al., 2007).

In many cases, the

articles demonstrate that a common belief about the civil justice system
is mistaken.

There is deeply entrenched opposition to this knowledge,

however, so it is not surprising that this research has not yet changed
public understanding (Baker, 2005a; Haltom & McCann, 2004).
Nevertheless, this information has already improved the public policy
debate by educating journalists and legislators.
Although accessible insurance company closed-claim reports are not
a panacea, they offer a an approach to improving the transparency of the
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civil justice system, particularly if the reporting requirements were
also imposed on parties that do not buy insurance from entities that are
subject to the reporting requirements.

In that regard, the NPDB

represents only a partially successful model.

The NPDB imposes

reporting obligations on anyone who pays on behalf of a medical
practitioner, not just insurance companies, but it does not impose any
reporting obligations for payments on behalf of hospitals and other
entities.
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND TRANSPARENCY IN SELECTED CIVIL JUSTICE AREAS
The preceding section described different ways that civil justice
researchers can obtain access to liability insurance claims information.
This section describes how they can find liability insurance information
about specific kinds of claims:

automobile accidents, medical injuries,

products injuries, consumer fraud, securities fraud, and, for comparison
purposes, occupational injuries. There are very substantial differences
across these fields in the kinds of insurance data that are publicly
available and, thus, in the degree to which liability insurance promotes
transparency.
Automobile Accidents
Automobile liability claims are the single largest category of tort
claims in the U.S., reflecting the ubiquity of both the automobile and
automobile liability insurance. With very limited exceptions, automobile
liability insurance is mandatory in the U.S.

As a result, liability

insurance is nearly coextensive with automobile liability and,
therefore, liability insurance institutions have the potential to
provide nearly comprehensive data about this part of the civil justice
system.
At the aggregate level in the U.S., automobile insurers that are
subject to the NAIC financial reporting requirements cover the vast
majority of automobile liabilities.

Thus, the NAIC financial data

provide a good guide to aggregate developments in auto liability losses
over time.

While these data are subject to the limitations discussed

earlier, the underwriting cycle in automobile insurance is less dramatic
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than in other areas such as medical and products liability

(Baker,

2004).
At the individual claim level, companies that provide information
services to insurers have a very rich and detailed understanding of the
automobile claim settlement environment.

Although the IRC data are

expensive, they are available to civil justice researchers, and RAND has
put them to good use (Carroll and Abrahamse, 2001).
Thanks to the fieldwork of H. Laurence Ross, civil justice
researchers once had a detailed understanding of automobile insurance
claims handling (Ross, 1970).

That fieldwork was carried out in the

1960s, however, well before the development of call centers,
computerized claims settlement models, and the other features of the
contemporary auto-claiming environment.

As a result, it seems quite

likely that Ross’s description is out of date in important respects.
Medical Injuries
In recent years, medical injuries have been subject to intensive
civil justice research in the U.S. (collected in Baker, 2005a).

For

example, the extensive closed-claim research has now conclusively
rejected the charge that medical liability claims are paid in the U.S.
without regard to the merits of cases (Studdert et al., 2006; Peters,
2007). Yet key facts about the medical liability landscape in the U.S.
remain in hot dispute, most significantly facts relating to the severity
of medical liability claims and to the aggregate financial dimensions of
medical liability.
For reasons that are not well documented, a substantial fraction of
the medical liability risk is spread outside of traditional liability
insurance institutions or is retained by large health care organizations
(Tillinghast Towers Perrin, 2007).

As a result, the financial reports

filed by liability insurance companies do not provide a reliable window
on the financial dimensions of medical liability risk.

The percentage

of the medical liability risk that lies outside the reach of traditional
liability insurance is unknown, and the large price swings that result
from the insurance underwriting cycle in the medical liability field
provides reason to believe that there is substantial movement into and
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out of the traditional liability insurance market over time. (Baker,
2005b)
There are no organizations that collect and release medical
liability information comparable to that collected and released by IRC
and ISO for automobile accident claims.

As described earlier, some

states require liability insurers to file closed-claim reports with the
state insurance departments and the National Practitioner Data Bank
grants limited public access. But those closed-claim reports are subject
to the limitations described earlier in this chapter.
Some medical liability insurance companies have provided civil
justice researchers with access to their closed-claim files and the
resulting research has made a substantial contribution to the field
(e.g., Studdert, et al., 2006).

But due to the highly politicized

nature of medical liability, insurers have tended to provide access only
to researchers associated with medical institutions.

This is a concrete

example of the bias that can result from relying on discretionary access
to insurance data.5

Most civil justice researchers have been unable to

gain access to closed-claim files, except through the very limited
information that is provided to state insurance departments in Florida,
Texas and, recently, Missouri. If the NAIC Model Law provides for
researcher access to the closed- claim reports, and if states adopt that
model law, our understanding of the medical malpractice aspect of the
civil justice system will be significantly improved. To date, there has
been no effort to study the handling of medical liability insurance
claims using qualitative methods comparable to Ross’s study of auto
liability insurance claims handling.

This would be a worthy area for

future research.
Products Injuries
Liability insurance provides even less systematic information about
the product injury portion of the civil justice system in the U.S. As
____________
5 Of course, access to medical institutions is much better than no
access at all. The professional association of anesthesiologists, for
example, has used liability insurance claim data as part of a safety
program that has achieved dramatic reductions in patient injuries.
(Cooper 2008)
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with medical injuries, the insurance underwriting cycle plays a
significant role in the movement of products risk into and out of
traditional liability insurance arrangements.

In addition, as with

medical injuries, a substantial but uncertain portion of the risk is not
shifted to traditional liability insurance companies that are subject to
the NAIC financial reporting regime.

For example, there is reason to

believe that at least a plurality, if not a majority, of pharmaceutical
liability risks do not purchase traditional liability insurance in the
U.S. (e.g., Dowding 2006)
There are additional limits on what can be learned from liability
insurance information in the products context that go well beyond the
limits in the medical liability context in the U.S.

First, with the

possible exception of Texas, there are no mandatory closed-claim
reporting regimes for products liability that compare to those in the
medical liability arena. Second, asbestos claims cast a large shadow
over the products liability that makes it difficult to interpret
aggregate products liability claiming and payment data.

Third, there is

reason to believe that manufacturers and other entities with significant
products liability risk typically purchase liability insurance programs
with a very substantial “self-insured retention” (essentially, a very
large deductible), and these entities very often have in-house
facilities for handling tort claims, or use third-party-claims
management services, to handle claims within the retention.
As a result, a substantial but uncertain portion of products
liability claims against defendants that do purchase traditional
liability insurance would not be reflected in liability insurance
company claims or loss data.

Product liability claims that ripen into

mass torts present additional complications relating to the involvement
of large numbers of liability insurance policies and liability insurance
companies, even in cases in which the mass tort actions are directed at
a single manufacturer. Moreover, in some cases there are very
significant disputes over the extent to which the claims are covered by
all or part of the liability insurance program, with the result that
claims are handled by the defendant manufacturer and the liability
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insurers pay a lump sum in settlement of their obligations and do not
maintain claim specific files

(Abraham, 2001).

Consumer Fraud
States in the U.S. have enacted a variety of statutory regimes that
provide liability for consumer fraud.

Because consumer fraud is not

covered by liability insurance - with the exception of securities fraud,
which is covered by D&O insurance (Baker & Griffith, 2007) -

liability

insurance obviously does not provide a window on this aspect of the
civil justice system.

Other important kinds of civil justice claims

that fall outside the insurance umbrella are contract claims and claims
involving real estate transactions.
Occupational Injuries and Workers Compensation
Occupational injuries are subject to workers’ compensation laws in
the U.S., and the vast majority of employees are covered by workers’
compensation insurance.

Alhough there are substantial differences in

the details of workers’ compensation arrangements across states, most of
these systems include strong reporting requirements that make workers’
compensation claim payments more transparent than claim payments in most
parts of the civil justice system.

However, the administrative nature

of the formal workers’ compensation claims process is less transparent
than the formal, court-centered process of the civil justice system.
Still, because much of the real work of the civil justice system takes
place in insurance company claim offices and in settlements negotiated
among the parties, the level of transparency of the two systems may not
be so different.
Workers’ compensation insurance claims reporting is governed by
statistical plans promulgated by the insurance departments of each
state.

Most of these plans are standardized and administered by the

National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI).

Pursuant to these

plans workers’ compensation insurance companies file detailed electronic
reports at the individual claim level that identify such information as
the date of the claim, the occupational class of the employer and
employee, and the incurred loss (incurred loss includes both past and
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projected future payments).6 In the past the individual claim level data
has not included the nature of the injury, but that information may be
collected in the future.

These data are available to researchers, and

NCCI and other workers compensation experts are notably available to
talk to researchers through the NCCI Annual Issues Symposium.
Self-insured workers’ compensation plans are not required to file
reports with state insurance departments.

They do report some data

directly to the state workers’ compensation agency, but these data are
not standardized and aggregated by the NCCI.

As a result, describing

the aggregate operation of the workers’ compensation requires some
extrapolation and estimation.

With that said, the available data make

it possible to describe the workers’ compensation claiming universe more
accurately and comprehensively than any part of the civil justice
system, with the possible exception of medical malpractice in Florida,
Missouri, and Texas.
INCREASING TRANSPARENCY THROUGH LIABILITY INSURANCE
Arguably, liability insurance reduces the transparency of the civil
justice system by facilitating a private, bureaucratic claim management
approach to insured liabilities rather than the public, adversarial
justice approach of the courts.

In my view, a bureaucratic, claims

management approach would be an inevitable feature of any functioning
civil justice system in a mass-market economy.

Others may disagree,

but, as a practical matter, changing to a more individualized justice
approach would require a commitment of such vast public resources that
such a change lies outside the scope of the immediate public policy
debate.
With that said, there is no reason why the presently private nature
of claims management cannot be brought into public view, though that
result cannot be accomplished without government action.

As noted

earlier, insurance is a very competitive business, and superior
information about claims can provide a competitive advantage to larger
____________
The NCCI information is based on a telephone interview with Barry
Llewellyn of NCCI, together with information gathered from the NCCI
website: www.ncci.com.

6
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insurers.

It is not in their interest to share that information with

potential competitors, and we cannot expect them to do so voluntarily.
With the exception of the auto claims data provided by the Insurance
Research Bureau, all of the most important sources of data described in
this chapter are the result of government mandates.
The NCCI-administered workers’ compensation claims reporting
system, the NPDB, and the medical malpractice closed-claims reporting
systems in Texas, Florida, and Missouri provide models on which to
build.

In adapting those systems to better serve transparency goals, it

would be essential to bring civil justice researchers who have worked
with those systems into the process.
The current NAIC effort to prepare a model medical malpractice
claims reporting law is one such example, though it is too soon to tell
whether the medical and insurance industries will succeed in their
efforts to deny public access to the closed claim reports.7 Like many
such NAIC efforts, the medical malpractice model law drafting process
appears to have been dominated by insurance industry interests,8 perhaps
because of the inevitable tendency for specialist regulators to begin to
see the world through the eyes of the high-status people whom they
regulate (Randall, 1999).

For that reason, and because of the

significance of uninsured liabilities in fields such as medical
malpractice and products liability, efforts to create truly transparent
claim reporting systems should be informed by the insurance industry and
insurance industry regulators, but should not take place within the
field of insurance regulation.
The NPDB, which was established by federal legislation, provides a
partially successful model, subject to the important caveat regarding
the lack of reporting obligations for defendants other than doctors. The
____________
7 The current draft of the proposed Model Law and comments and other
information can be accessed at:
http://www.naic.org/committees_c_sitf.htm
8

For example, as of the time of this writing the NAIC working
group had decided to draft the model law so that it does not require
insurers to file reports on “no payment” cases despite the fact that the
State of Missouri has done so in the past with no apparent negative
impact on the liability insurance industry in Missouri.
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NPDB does not contain records of payments by hospitals and other entity
defendants.

This reporting differential skews the transparency provided

by the NPDB in two ways.

First, there is the obvious consequence that

the NPDB only provides a partial view into medical malpractice payments.
Second, in cases with both an entity defendant and an individual
defendant, there is an incentive to craft the settlement so that the
entity, but not the doctor, pays.

This incentive is particularly strong

in situations in which the doctor and the entity have the same insurance
arrangements.

Any effort to increase transparency in the future must be

crafted to avoid such gaps in reporting obligations.

Other limitations

of the NPDB include the reporting of claim payment amounts by dollar
ranges rather than absolute amounts (which makes statistical analysis
more difficult) and the lack of standardized injury severity information
such as the 9 point scale developed by the NAIC.
CONCLUSION: LIMITS ON TRANSPARENCY THROUGH LIABILITY INSURANCE
This chapter has described some of the main ways that liability
insurance data and institutions contribute to the transparency of the
civil justice system.

Because this contribution differs substantially

across lines of insurance and because some liabilities are not insured
at all, aggregate liability insurance data do not provide a reliable
guide to the size or scope of the civil justice system as a whole.

At

best, the data provide a guide to the portions of that system that
involve commonly insured liabilities.

As illustrated in this chapter,

the extent to which they provide a reliable guide differs significantly
from one type of liability to another.
The single best way to improve the transparency of the civil
justice system would be to expand mandatory claim level reporting along
the lines suggested in this chapter.

These reporting requirements would

impose a burden on the liability insurance industry. They would also
impose a burden on the large organizations that use alternative risk
transfer and retention mechanism.
at least two reasons.
public good.

These burdens are worth imposing for

First, civil justice transparency is a valuable

Second, the liability insurance industry and other large

organizations have been vigorous supporters of restrictive civil justice
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reform, in part based on unverified claims about the wasteful costs that
civil justice institutions impose on U.S. society.

It is reasonable to

require organizations that make such claims to provide public access to
the data that are required to evaluate them.
*

*

*

In concluding, it is worth noting that this chapter provides yet
another illustration of how liability insurance complicates the ability
to observe the civil justice system. There is no “pure” civil justice
system that liability insurance can help us observe.

Liability

insurance transforms civil justice claims even as it helps make them
more observable.

Liability claims are shaped to match the available

liability insurance, with the result that “exclusions in liability
insurance policies create, in effect, remote islands of tort liability
that lawyers and law professors know about, but almost no one goes to
visit.” (Baker 2006 at 7)

Liability insurance transforms claims against

individuals into de facto claims against massively repeat players –
insurance companies. Liability insurance limits are de facto caps on
damages.

Liability insurance claims personnel transform some complex

liability rules into simpler, more administrable rules of thumb. And
negotiations over the boundaries of liability insurance – who is
obligated to buy liability insurance, in what amounts, and against which
liabilities – amount to negotiations over the boundaries of the civil
justice system itself. (Id.)
There is no system of civil justice that liability insurance
institutions can help us observe without transforming that system. As
Kenneth Abraham has compellingly documented, “The tort system, not only
as it exists on paper but also how it works in practice, is a product of
the insurance system, just as the insurance system is a product of the
tort system.” (Abraham 2008 at 1).
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